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Critical Theory and the Struggle for Recognition
David Ingram1 
Abstract: I focus on the recent attempt by Habermas to provide a formal criterion for test-
ing the legitimacy of group rights. Habermas argues that group-rights are legitimate only 
when they protect groups from discrimination by other groups. Group rights that aim to 
preserve groups against their own members, by contrast, are illegitimate. In my opinion, 
this way of drawing the distinction overlooks the link between anti-discrimination and 
preservation. Furthermore, I argue that preservation of a group identity can be legitimate 
so long as the group in question allows freedom of exit from the group.
Indigenous peoples and old-order religious sects are often praised as propo-nents of sustainable collectivist economies that respect nature and community 
against the rapaciousness of capitalism. These groups sought – and acquired – 
special rights to self-governance and exemptions regarding education, property, 
and business. These rights, however, also protect cultural patterns that some-
times reinforce conformity to the group and patriarchal hierarchy. Therefore, 
they seem problematic from the standpoint of a critical theory that esteems indi-
vidual emancipation and social equality.
Yet critical theory’s recent preoccupation with multicultural struggles for rec-
ognition suggests a different assessment of group rights. My goal in this paper is 
not to retrace the vast literature on this topic that has been generated by Honneth, 
Fraser, Benhabib, and other critical theorists.2 Instead I shall focus on the recent 
1 David Ingram is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago. He is the 
author Habermas (Cornell University, 2010); Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason 
(Yale University, 1987); Critical Theory and Philosophy (Paragon House, 1990) and 
editor of Critical Theory: The Essential Readings (Paragon House, 1991) and From 
Critical Theory to Structuralism: Volume Five. The History of Continental Thought 
(Acumen/Routledge, 2010). His most recent books are World Crisis and Underdevel-
opment: A Critical Theory of Poverty, Agency, and Coercion (Cambridge University, 
2018) and The Ethics of Global Development (Routledge, 2018).
2 A. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts 
(Cambridge, MA: 1996); A. Honneth and N. Fraser, Redistribution or Recognition: 
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attempt by Habermas to provide a formal criterion for testing the legitimacy of 
group rights. Habermas argues that group-rights are legitimate only when they 
protect groups from discrimination by other groups. Group rights that aim to 
preserve groups against their own members, by contrast, are illegitimate. In my 
opinion, this way of drawing the distinction overlooks the link between anti-dis-
crimination and preservation. Furthermore, I argue that preservation of a group 
identity can be legitimate so long as the group in question allows freedom of exit 
from the group.
I. Critical Theory’s Ambivalence Toward Groups
One might ask, why should critical theorists take group rights seriously in the 
first place? Marx’s emphasis on class struggle as an engine of historical prog-
ress led him to advocate for the rights of the proletariat against the rights of the 
bourgeoisie. If we allow that the motivation underlying this struggle stems from 
a feeling of indignation and insult on the part of the oppressed, then one might 
follow Honneth in describing this dialectic in Hegelian terms, as originating in a 
failure to achieve mutual recognition. But Marx did not understand it that way. 
According to Marx, recognition of the humanity of the proletariat – or rather, 
recognition that the proletariat’s interests embody the interests of humanity – 
does not entail reciprocal recognition of the bourgeoisie and its interests. Indeed, 
Marx believed that a fully emancipated classless society would abolish the kinds 
of economic differences that underlie Hegel’s struggle for recognition entirely.
What Hegel may have had in mind by the famous struggle for recognition 
between master and slave discussed in the Jena Phenomenology and Berlin En-
cyclopedia, as well as his references to recognition in his discussion of objective 
spirit in such places as the Philosophy of Right, is certainly debatable. Robert 
Pippin, for one, argues that Hegel introduced recognition to capture what can 
only be characterized as an essential, ontological category of free agency.3 Free 
A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London: Verso, 2003); S. Benhabib, Situating 
the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (London: 
Routledge, 1992); The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
3  R. Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008
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agency requires that one be capable, in principle, of justifying one’s actions to 
others by appeal to reasons they would recognize as good reasons. Recognition 
here functions as a medium for obtaining self-certainty, or intersubjective valida-
tion of what one has done and what one has made of oneself. Such a conception 
of other-facilitated self-determination and self-ownership is undoubtedly related 
to how persons identify themselves and their actions, and so is related to notions 
of personal and social identity. However, Pippin insists that this conception of 
“recognitive politics,” or politics of mutual justification and accountability, is 
but thinly related – if at all – to the struggle for recognition that animates what 
Charles Taylor4 and Axel Honneth have separately addressed under the headings 
of a “politics of recognition” or (simply) “identity politics,” wherein members of 
discrete groups seek psychological fulfillment and others’ esteem. 
 Without entering into the debate between Pippin and Honneth on Hegel’s no-
tion of recognitive politics,5 it bears repeating that whatever analogies commen-
tators have drawn between Hegel’s struggle for recognition and class struggle 
are probably overwrought or, as we shall, misplaced. Unlike class struggle, the 
Hegelian struggle for recognition aims at recognizing individuality and differ-
ence; in the framework of those contemporary discussions of “identity politics” 
that have been developed by Honneth, Taylor, and others, recognitive politics 
aims at preserving groups whose members share a distinctive religious, ethnic, 
national, or racial identity. Although Marx’s early reflections on the Jewish ques-
tion show that he was acutely sensitive to the right of particular religious groups 
4 C. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Exam-
ining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25-73.
5 For an attempt at mediating the difference between Pippin and his critics, see my 
“Recognition within the Limits of Reason,” Inquiry (forthcoming). Habermas and 
Honneth also differ from Pippin in arguing that it was only in Hegel’s early writings, 
viz., in the System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit (1802-04), that Hegel 
developed a fully dialogical account of recognitive politics of the sort that they, along 
with Robert Brandom, have developed. For Habermas’s contribution to this discussion 
regarding the development of Hegel’s thought, see See J. Habermas, “From Kant to 
Hegel and Back Again,” in Truth and Justification (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2003), pp. 
190- 202; “Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism” in 
Between Naturalism and Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), esp. pp. 293-96; 
“Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic State” in The Inclusion of the Other: 
Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: 1998), pp. 203-36.
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to protect their identity against those who would demand their assimilation, such 
reflections hardly constitute an unqualified endorsement of a right to be recog-
nized. For Marx, such recognition rights reflect the limited standpoint of liber-
alism – a strictly political form of emancipation that cannot be dissociated from 
the egoism of a civil society constituted by private property.
 Here one might chide Marx for collapsing recognition rights into property 
rights, especially since his critique of abstract notions of formal equality and 
formal right, which he continued to develop in later years, displays a keen sen-
sitivity to the irreducible individuality of persons and their needs. It is precisely 
this appreciation of individuality that later critical theorists appropriated in con-
fronting the hegemonic conformism of a capitalist society composed of consum-
er monads. Most important for our purposes, their grasp of the psychological 
and sociological dynamics underlying processes of individuation led them to 
develop a highly ambivalent attitude toward groups and their identities. On the 
one hand, critical theorists increasingly came to see specific groups – religious 
groups and counter-cultural groups, to name just a few – as embodying forms of 
communal solidarity that aspire to a utopian reconciliation with nature and the 
other. On the other hand, the psychological dynamics underlying group solidari-
ty struck them as regressive and conformist. To restate the problem dialectically, 
it seemed to them that the psychodynamics of group identity extinguished the 
very individuality that groups were supposed to foster, in contradistinction to the 
abstract “atomistic” individualism of mass society.
This same ambivalence towards group solidarity continues to haunt the work of 
second- and third-generation critical theorists. Habermas, Honneth, and Benhabib 
– just to name a few – by no means dismiss the importance of group membership 
for healthy individuation, autonomy, and solidarity. Following their thought, it is 
reason – specifically communicative reason – that prevents groups from solidify-
ing to the point where they stifle the autonomy and individuality of their members. 
But how congenial is critical rationality to the continued survival of a group 
bound together by an inherited – that is to say, involuntarily acquired – identity? 
Might not the rational demand to open one’s doors to all manner of belief and 
practice threaten to so radically transform a group’s identity that it no longer 
makes sense to say that it remains the same group after this critical encounter? 
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This is indeed one of the possibilities entertained by Habermas, but it cannot be 
one that, without further qualification, he endorses, and for two reasons: first, 
it returns us to the postmodernist idea that culture is simply an assortment of 
detachable goods that can be voluntarily chosen for this or that reason – as if 
these goods did not constitute one’s innermost identity. Second, it runs counter 
to the liberal right to associate and communicate freely with those with whom 
one agrees. The democratic right to self-determination entails a protective group 
right to non-interference that effectively entitles the majority of a group to close 
its doors to outsiders and to expel heretical insiders. More importantly, it some-
times entails the official granting of exemptions and privileges that protect the 
group from discriminatory treatment at the hands of society. 
II. Habermas on Multiculturalism
Unlike many Leftists, Habermas seems untroubled by the fact that identity pol-
itics has assumed greater prominence than class struggle in many parts of the 
world. I will not here explore the reasons why this is so except to note that his 
main concern in this as in most of his recent discussions about the interface 
of law and democratic politics is theoretical rather than practical. While many 
critical theorists are keen on deconstructing group identity or raising questions 
about the very concept of recognition, Habermas, like Rawls, is concerned about 
the reasonable limits of multicultural pluralism in liberal society. The question of 
limits must be raised because different ideological groups vie for political power, 
thereby potentially threatening the neutrality of the state which is so essential for 
guaranteeing an equal protection of liberty. Habermas and Rawls assume that 
most cultural groups agree in their reasonable acceptance of liberal values. They 
also assume that reasonable groups will not only tolerate each other but will of-
fer each other ideologically neutral arguments when discussing basic rights and 
other constitutional essentials. 
But how unequally can the state treat the various groups that make up civil 
society without ceasing to be neutral? 6 On one hand, people expect to be treated 
6 Habermas notes one important difference between multicultural struggles over iden-
tity and recognition and feminist struggles of the same kind: “. . . from the point of 
view of members of the majority culture, the revised interpretation of the achieve-
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the same way in virtue of their humanity. On the other hand, they expect to be 
treated differently in recognition of their particular cultural identity. Protecting 
the cultural identity of a particular group with special privileges and protections, 
however, contradicts the principle of equality. Indeed, the contradiction only 
deepens when the groups clamoring for special rights are themselves illiberal 
and undemocratic. 
Habermas denies that group rights necessarily contradict liberal equality. He 
insists that affirmative action policies, bilingual education programs, and laws 
that exempt members of pacifist religions from military service are properly un-
derstood as protections against forms of discrimination. These policies aim at 
ensuring the equal inclusion of persons who have different needs. For Habermas, 
cultural groups are not self-acting agents that claim rights over and above the 
rights of their individual members (BNR: 302). Rather, they designate conditions 
of agency to which their individual members claim a legal right. This right, in 
turn, derives from an individually held right to be treated with self-respect (BNR: 
300). 
ments and interests of others does not necessarily alter their own role in the same 
way that the reinterpretation of the relations between the sexes alters the role of men” 
(IO: 211-12). This assumption can be questioned. Although multicultural struggles 
for recognition can take the form of an identity-preserving politics that aims to resist 
assimilation, it is hard to imagine how this kind of politics does not also transform 
both how the minority group understands its identity and how the majority group, in 
recognizing the distinctive identity of the minority, understands its own identity). For 
example, the “politically correct” acceptance of African-Americans’ expression of 
“Black Pride” versus the un-politically correct expression of ‘White Pride” by Euro-
pean-descended persons has led to a questioning among whites regarding the mean-
ing of their own “whiteness.” Habermas’s tendency to underestimate the extent to 
which multicultural struggles for recognition can be “transformative” of the dominant 
majority’s understanding of its own identity may stem from his failure to adequately 
distinguish between different types of identity struggles (for example, he lumps to-
gether the struggle “of oppressed ethnic and cultural minorities”). Struggles for racial 
(and sometimes ethnic) recognition directly involve struggles against racism and its 
entrenched social hierarchies; struggles for cultural recognition (as in the case of 
French-speaking Quebeqois) typically do not. The latter’s assertion of their own right 
to self-determination need not affect in any deep way the self-understanding of En-
glish-speaking Canadians. For further examination of the complex issues surrounding 
race, ethnicity, and culture as it pertains to the question of whiteness as an identity, see 
chapter two of Rights, Democracy, and Fulfillment. I thank Drew Pierce for bringing 
these difficulties within Habermas’s text to my attention.
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However, because culture is necessary for constituting personal identity, it is 
not merely instrumental to the pursuit of personal preferences.7 In Habermas’s 
words, 
The concept of a person acting instrumentally who selects from fixed 
options according to culturally shaped preferences fails to clarify the 
intrinsic meaning of culture for an individual’s way of life . . . Against 
this background it makes sense to derive cultural rights directly from 
the principle of the inviolability of human dignity (Article I of the Ger-
man Basic Law): the equal protection of the integrity of the person, to 
which all citizens have a claim, includes the guarantee of equal access 
to the patterns of communication, social relations, traditions, and rela-
tions of recognition that are required or desired for developing, repro-
ducing, and renewing their personal identities (BNR: 295-6). 
According to Habermas, the distinction between culture as an involuntary 
condition of agency and culture as an instrumental good, or resource, that can 
be voluntarily acquired marks out a distinctive niche for “identity politics” (or 
the “politics of recognition”). Siding with Fraser in her debate with Honneth,8 
7 See W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), pp. 34-48. For a critique of Kymlicka on the concept of a societal culture, see 
my Group Rights (loc. cit.), pp. 80ff.
8 See N. Fraser and A. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosoph-
ical Exchange (London: Verso, 2003). Honneth argues that the struggle for recogni-
tion provides a unitary normative framework capable of explaining the struggle for 
economic justice (redistribution). Fraser, by contrast, sees these struggles as analyti-
cally distinct (but empirically intertwined). In her opinion, recognition involves pos-
itively affirming another person’s distinctive identity, while the redistribution aims 
at securing parity of resources or capabilities. Still others, such as Brian Barry, re-
duce struggles for recognition to struggles for redistribution (voluntary access to and 
choice for goods), so that the injustice committed against Sikhs when they are forced 
by mandatory motorcycle helmet laws to remove their turbans is simply a “restriction 
in their range of opportunities for choosing one or another religious committee.” In 
Hegel, the category of recognition (as developed in the master-slave dialectic of the 
Phenomenology) is linked to non-domination. Despite Habermas’s earlier acceptance 
of Honneth’s reduction of all political struggles to a struggle for recognition (see 
chapter 3) his position is close to Fraser’s; rather than classify mis-recognition (or 
lack of recognition) as a simple form of domination or economic oppression, he un-
derstands it as an exclusion from equal citizenship. See B. Barry, Culture and Equal-
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he clearly distinguishes struggles for social justice that revolve around social 
status and oppression – the unequal distribution of goods and resources – from 
struggles for recognition that revolve around domination and unequal inclusion. 
The discussion of “multiculturalism” calls for a more careful dif-
ferentiation within the concept of civic equality. Discrimination or 
disrespect, nonpresence in the public arenas of society, or a collec-
tive lack of self-respect point to an incomplete and unequal inclusion 
of citizens who are denied full status as members of the political 
community. The principle of equality is violated in the dimension 
of membership, not in the dimension of social justice. The degree of 
inclusion concerns the horizontal relations among members of the 
political community, whereas the scope of the system of statuses con-
cerns the vertical relations among citizens of a stratified society. So-
cial strata are conditioned by patterns of distribution of social wealth 
. . . whatever counts as economic exploitation and social underpriv-
ilege . . . and whatever counts as deprivation. . . The inequality lies 
in the dimension of distributive justice, not in the dimension of the 
inclusion of members (BNR: 294).
Habermas follows this passage with an important qualification: questions of 
distributive justice and cultural recognition, he notes, “are almost always empir-
ically intertwined.” Indeed, his own account of cultural rights tends to blur these 
two aspects of civic equality, as when he observes that “[collective rights] em-
power cultural groups to preserve and make available the resources on which their 
members draw in forming and stabilizing their personal identities” (BNR:297). 
Now, Habermas’s conflation of culture as instrumental resource and culture as 
condition of identity is not without significance. Habermas’s emphasis on culture 
as “involuntarily acquired” identity leads him to stress the preservative function of 
collective rights while his treatment of culture as resource leads him to privilege 
the rights of individuals to appropriate culture according to their preferences.
Let us examine more closely the weaker current in Habermas’s thinking about 
group rights. If the language community into which we are originally socialized 
ity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 36. 
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remains, for most of us, a permanent part of our identity, whether we will it so 
or not, then protecting and preserving that identity – extending it into the future 
– will obviously be very important to us. Rights that “grant the representatives
of identity groups to organize and administer themselves” also enable them to 
“police” the identity of the group by limiting membership to those who accept 
that identity. The right to associate with like-minded persons permits members 
of a group to exclude outsiders who reject that identity. Indeed dissenters are 
viewed no differently than outsiders.
The right of the group to preserve and protect its identity is acknowledged by 
Habermas when he asserts that a group can legitimately restrict the freedom of 
its own members if it permits them full freedom to exit the group. Citing William 
Galston,9 he observes that “realistic” conditions for exit must include the follow-
ing provisions: First, members must have the freedom to inform themselves of 
alternative lifestyles; second, they must have the freedom to reflect on these life-
styles; third, they must not be coerced in their thinking by group-programming; 
and finally, they must not be denied skills that enable them to live outside the 
group should they choose to do so. (BNR: 303).
As we shall see, Habermas uses these conditions to argue against “strong” 
multicultural rights on the grounds that they “violate” the rights of individual 
members. However, it is important to note that in this context his insistence on 
exit conditions implicitly acknowledges the right of groups to protect and pre-
serve their identity even when it is not liberal or democratic.10 
Although Habermas does not discuss the deaf culture movement (DEAF), its 
demand for protective group rights exemplifies the problem of exit noted above. 
The use of cochlear implants in deaf children threatens the survival of sign lan-
guage around which deaf culture is based. The smaller this community becomes 
9 W. Galston, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” Ethics 105 (1995), p. 533.
10 Like Rawls, Habermas holds that principles of justice apply only indirectly to private 
associations (Rawls, but not Habermas, would say that they apply indirectly to the 
family, as well). Private associations, however, must respect the basic human and 
civil rights of their individual members. The Catholic Church is a hierarchical orga-
nization that excludes women from the priesthood as a part of its dogma; but women 
are not officially treated or recognized as inferiors. Hence, the Catholic Church merits 
a group right to be tax exempt - unlike Bob Jones University, which was threatened 
with losing its tax exempt status because of its racist admissions policy (BNR: 298). 
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the less political clout it has to get the resources it needs for its members, many of 
whom cannot speak or understand oral language with facility. At the same time, 
denying deaf children cochlear implants violates the capacity and fitness condi-
tions for exit stipulated above, since acquisition of an oral language must occur at 
an early age if deaf children are to have a good chance of learning it. 
The example of Deaf Culture also illustrates four conflicts between individual 
and group rights that Habermas expressly highlights. Three of these conflicts 
involve violations of equal protection. These violations occur “(a) when differ-
ent identity groups dispute each other’s rights and privileges, or (b) when, as is 
typically the case with multicultural claims, one group demands equal treatment 
with other groups, or (c) when, as in a complementary case, nonmembers see 
themselves as disadvantaged in relation to members of privileged groups (white 
people, for example, by quotas for nonwhites)” (BNR: 297). Taking Deaf Cul-
ture as our example, we observe these conflicts reflected in decisions concerning 
whether (a) scarce resources should be diverted to signers and other resources 
for the deaf, (b) Deaf Culture – which arises from a disability – defines a genuine 
cultural group that has a pima facie right to exist; or (c) affirmative action hiring 
quotas for deaf people don’t discriminate against the hearing. 
However, it is the fourth conflict between individual and groups rights that 
worries Habermas. This conflict arises whenever “elites use their expanded orga-
nizational rights and competencies to stabilize the collective identity of groups, 
even if it entails violating the individual rights of dissenting members of the 
group” (ibid). This last case, Habermas believes, is fundamentally different from 
cases in which claims advanced by different cultural groups conflict with each 
another. In these latter cases, protecting groups from external threats by oth-
er groups can be justified because respecting others in their individuality can 
scarcely be accomplished without also respecting their cultural identities. Haber-
mas therefore concludes that group rights that make available particular cultural 
resources – such as providing bilingual education, easing burdens of religious 
practice, and so on – are thus wholly in keeping with liberal demands for equal 
inclusion and may even be necessary to combat the spread of a mass-consumer, 
Americanized mono-culture (PC: 75). 
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But it is the fourth case – involving a group’s right to protect its identity 
against internal threats – specifically against individual non-conformists – that 
Habermas thinks is most problematic. In this connection Habermas expressly 
takes issue with a number of landmark legal decisions, ranging from the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision to allow Amish parents the right to remove their chil-
dren from school upon completing eight years of formal education11 and the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s decision to allow patriarchal tribal councils to func-
tion as the last court of appeal for processing women tribal members’ legal suits 
against gender discrimination12 to Quebec’s language laws, which require that 
11 Writing for the majority in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) Chief Justice Warren Burger 
upheld the right of the Amish to remove their children from public school after the 
eighth grade on the grounds that doing so was necessary to protect their way of life 
from “worldly influences.” Citing evidence showing that “Amish are quite effective 
and self-reliant citizens,” Burger denied that the state had a sufficiently compelling 
interest in educating Amish children beyond the 8th grade (age 14) that would warrant 
impeding the Amish in teaching their children skills of farming and domestic labor 
essential to their way of life. Writing for the minority, Justice William Douglas argued 
that removing children from public school at this age would “forever (bar them) from 
entry into the new and amazing world of diversity,” thereby stunting and deforming 
them. Although this dissent explicitly addresses the absence of conditions – specif-
ically the absence of knowledge regarding alternative lifestyles and the absence of 
reflective capacities- that would enable Amish children to exit their religious commu-
nity (despite their option to take a one-year hiatus from the community upon turning 
eighteen) – it does not address what – according to Nussbaum – is perhaps the most 
salient concern: the inequality in education received by Amish boys and girls. Where-
as Amish boys learn skills, such as carpentry and farming, that are highly marketable 
in the outside world (thereby satisfying the fourth exit condition of “fitness”) Amish 
girls learn domestic skills that are much less so. Studies have also shown that the psy-
chological pressures faced by Amish children – knowledge that they will be shunned 
and will lose their inheritance should they choose to leave the community – conspire 
with lack of knowledge about the outside world (they are denied access to televisions, 
radios, and most telephones) and their unusual style of behavior and language to 
discourage children from exercising their option (studies show that 75% of Amish 
children and 95% of Hutterite children remain in their communities after adulthood). 
Given these facts, Habermas’s assertion that the Supreme Court “accepts a violation 
of the civil rights of juveniles to basic education that would enable them to make their 
way in complex societies” (BNR: 299) is not entirely implausible, despite the fact 
that it ignores important gender differences that suggest that the rights in question are 
“diminished” (but perhaps not violated) in different degrees. See Nussbaum (2000), 
pp. 232-34 and Ingram (2004), pp. 193-94.. 
12 Habermas has in mind a number of cases cited by Kymlicka (loc. cit., p. 38ff) in 
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French-speaking parents and immigrants send their children to French-speak-
ing schools. According to Habermas, in these instances preservation of cultural 
identity was allowed to trump the rights of (a) children to an education that 
would have enabled them to competently function outside of Amish society, (b) 
women to non-discriminatory treatment, and (c) parents to choose whether their 
children go to non-French-speaking schools (BNR: 299ff).
With the sole exception of tribal rights – which Habermas treats as morally 
justifiable “reparations” for past violations of sovereignty that sometimes permit 
“illiberal” forms of patriarchal authority and collective property that are “alien” 
to the egalitarian and individualistic premises of liberal constitutional law13 – 
which patriarchal tribal councils denied women (but not men) who married outside 
the tribe the right to have their children included as members of the community in full 
standing. Another case not mentioned by Habermas involves Evangelical Christians 
who were denied access to their tribal threshing implements for refusing to participate 
in tribal religious ceremonies. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) the United 
States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the patriarchal council’s decisions regarding 
patrilineal descent on the grounds that doing so “conformed” to the tribe’s tradition. 
In the latter case the Court ruled in favor of the Evangelicals. For further discussion 
of these and other cases involving Indian tribes, see Ingram (2000), ch. 5. 
13 According to Habermas, states such as the United States, Canada, and Australia are 
“morally compelled” – out of “equal respect for all” – to “rectify the historical injustice 
to indigenous peoples who were integrated, forcibly subjugated, and subjected to cen-
turies of discrimination” by conceding “broad autonomy to maintain or restore specific 
forms of traditional authority and collective property, even though in individual cases 
these conflict with the egalitarian principle and individualistic character of ‘equal rights 
for all.’ The result (see note 26) is that “an ‘illiberal’ social group is allowed to operate 
a legal system of its own within the liberal state” which “leads to irresolvable contra-
dictions” (BNR: 304). In contrast to this interpretation – which holds that the conflict 
in question “is reflected in law but does not emerge from it” since, ostensibly the ep-
isodes of subjugation and integration “predate the legal system” (BNR: 305) – one 
might argue that the conflict in question does indeed stem from the liberal legal system 
“colonizing” the indigenous community from the very beginning. The history of incor-
porating tribal peoples into the dominant liberal legal system occurred over a period 
of one hundred and fifty years in which tribal peoples first “lost” their treaty status 
as full-fledged sovereign nations, then lost their distinctive cultural identity, including 
their communal ownership of tribal property (replaced by individually owned plots of 
land), and then lost their status as aboriginals, having gained the rights of citizenship. 
Although the process of forced assimilation did not result in dissolving all reservations 
– tribal governments were often created and maintained by the government in order to
justify its control over the extraction of mineral wealth – it did result in the eventual 
subsumption of indigenous peoples’ tribal rights under the basic rights guaranteed by 
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non of these efforts to preserve a cultural group identity appears justified. More 
precisely, they all threaten the kinds of individual rights that discourse theory of 
law regards as most basic, namely rights to free and open communication. Any 
law that grants a group the right to resist changes in its identity by shielding the 
culture and language of its individual members from “contamination” by other 
cultures and languages seems to constrain the very communication by which 
persons, from adolescence on, undertake to voluntarily shape their identities in 
relations of free and undistorted mutual understanding. Responding to Charles 
Taylor’s defense of Quebec’s language laws, Habermas writes that:14
[T]he protection of forms of life and traditions in which identities 
are formed is supposed to foster the recognition of their members; it 
does not represent a kind of preservation of species by administrative 
means . . . . The constitutional state can make this hermeneutical 
achievement of the cultural reproduction of worlds possible, but it 
cannot guarantee it. For to guarantee survival would necessarily rob 
the members of the freedom to say yes or no, which nowadays is cru-
cial if they are to remain able to appropriate and preserve their cultur-
al heritage. When a culture has become reflexive, the only traditions 
and forms of life that can sustain themselves are those that bind their 
members, while at the same time allowing members to subject the 
the federal constitution (in the United States this happened in 1968, in Canada it hap-
pened in 1982). Tribal law, then, cannot contradict basic individual rights. Contrary to 
Habermas’s interpretation (BNR: 305), the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and semi-sovereign tribal governments seems more analogous to the relationship 
between the federal government and other private associations (including the family). 
That is to say, liberal principles apply indirectly to these associations, which have a 
right to limited self-determination – and therewith the freedom to adopt illiberal forms 
of governance and collective property – so long as they do not violate basic rights and 
permit dissidents a right to exit. For more on this, see Ingram (2000), chapter five. 
14 C. Taylor, et. al. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994). According to Taylor, “one has to distinguish the 
fundamental liberties, those that should never be infringed and therefore ought to be 
unassailably entrenched, on one hand, from privileges and immunities [i.e., the right 
of francophone and immigrant Quebeckers to send their children to English-speaking 
schools – D. I.]that are important, but that can be revoked or restricted for reasons of 
public policy – although one would need a strong reason to do this – on the other” (59).
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traditions to critical examination and leaving later generations the 
option of learning from other traditions or converting and setting for 
other shores (IO: 222). 
Quebec’s language laws, Habermas fears, are designed to guarantee the pres-
ervation of Quebecois Francophone culture by denying parents the basic com-
municative freedom to say “no” to a particular kind of education (and therewith 
a particular kind of identity) for their children (BNR: 300). If we assume that 
parents ought to have a right to determine what cultural identity their children 
will initially acquire, so long as doing so doesn’t deprive their children of the 
knowledge, critical aptitude, and psychological capacity that might enable them 
to later exit that cultural identity, then Quebec’s laws must be deemed illegiti-
mate. 
The idea that parents shouldn’t have this right against the community ap-
pears to rest on a deeply flawed analogy between cultural identity and species 
identity. It might be argued that cross-cultural “contamination” - either through 
cross-cultural marriage or cross-cultural exposure of some other kind – “di-
lutes” and thereby “weakens” the identity of a culture as much as cross-breed-
ing “weakens” the genetic identity of a species. But any weakening of a form 
of life is bad for it and – given the value of diversity for the eco-system as a 
whole - bad for all of us. So cultural preservation – like species preservation – 
constitutes an overriding value that permits the dominant majority in a cultural 
group to limit the extent to which the group’s members communicate with other 
groups. 
Leaving aside the “preservationists” questionable assumption that cross-fer-
tilization “weakens” rather than “strengthens” life forms and that the good 
of cultural preservation entitles groups to preserve their identity by whatever 
means, the very idea that cultural identities are self-contained and static – cut 
off from communication with other cultural forms of life - is deeply mistaken. 
As Taylor himself points out, members of any cultural group need recognition 
not only from their fellow members but also from members of other cultural 
groups. They need to know that their particular cultural identity is respected if 
not fully affirmed by others. More pertinent to our present concerns, Habermas 
argues that “the guarantee of the internal latitude necessary to assimilate a tradi-
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tion under conditions of dissent is decisive for the survival of cultural groups.” 
To be precise, “a dogmatically protected culture will not be able to reproduce 
itself, especially not in a social environment replete with alternatives” (BNR: 
303). Thus it is only by being freely interpreted – in dialog with other cultures – 
that a culture can be adapted to ever new and changing circumstances; and it is 
only through change in the face of new cultural challenges that a given culture’s 
practitioners relate to their own culture (and their own identity) with a degree 
of certainty.
III. Concluding Remarks
To conclude, Habermas’s understanding of group rights seems ambivalent. On 
one hand, the right to free association justifies the right of a majority to “support 
the continued existence of the cultural background of the collectivity directly” 
and this need not always happen “above the heads of its members” in a way that 
“would promote internal repression” (BNR: 301). Even if we agree with Haber-
mas and Brian Barry that, ontologically speaking, “cultures are simply not the 
kind of entity to which rights can properly be ascribed,” we can scarcely deny 
that “communities defined by some shared cultural characteristics (for example, 
a language) may under certain circumstances have valid claims . . . that arise 
from the legitimate interests of the members of the group”15 (ibid). Perhaps it 
was this – wholly legitimate – democratic decision by the people of Quebec 
– and not, as Habermas contends, the postulation of Quebecois Francophone
culture as an “intrinsic value” grounded in a “metaphysics of the good [that 
exists] independently of citizens . . . maintaining their personal identity” (BNR: 
301) - that led them to want to preserve equal access to their provincial Fran-
cophone culture against the hegemonic incursion of the national Anglophone 
culture. These interests would have included maintaining a common political 
language against the threat of fragmentation, as well as protecting mono-lingual 
French speakers from potential discrimination in the workplace and in accessing 
public accommodations. Furthermore, the four “exit” conditions mentioned by 
Habermas would have been available to French-speaking and immigrant parents 
15 Barry (2002), p. 67.
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who preferred to leave Quebec or provide special tutoring so that their children 
would be assured of an Anglophone up-bringing. 
On the other hand, Habermas’s concern to preserve the open communication 
so essential to free and undistorted identity-formation leads him to embrace a 
very different kind of identity politics: not the identity politics that is orient-
ed toward protecting access to cultural resources intrinsic to a group’s already 
(largely involuntary) linguistic identity, but an identity politics of postmodern 
transformation and destabilization. As he puts it, “the aim of multiculturalism 
- the mutual recognition of all members as equals – calls for a transformation 
of interpersonal relations via communicative action and discourse that can ulti-
mately be achieved only through debates over identity politics within the dem-
ocratic arena” (BNR: 293). This identity politics has little to do with protecting, 
for instance, the group privilege enjoyed by Sikhs to be exempt from motorcycle 
helmet laws – a protective privilege designed to ensure equal religious freedom 
– but it has everything to do with changing the way Sikhs and non-Sikhs under-
stand their own identities. Again, the awakening of “Black Pride” among African 
Americans and “sisterhood” among women in their struggle for recognition not 
only transformed how these misrecognized groups understood their own identi-
ties and needs, it also transformed how white people and men understood their 
own identities and needs.
In the end, Habermas is concerned that a politics of ensuring “equal access to 
cultural resources for any citizen who needs them to develop and maintain her 
personal identity” has already logically committed itself to a “politics of survival” 
in which the state undertakes to “ensure [the availability of these resources] in the 
future” (BNR: 300). However, the politics of cultural transformation which he 
offers as an alternative comes too close to abandoning the multicultural politics 
of equal recognition and equal protection that he himself regards as indispensable 
for maintaining a vibrant pluralistic society. Indeed, his criterion for a group’s 
legitimacy – namely that it pass the critical threshold “of the autonomous en-
dorsement of every single potential participant” (BNR: 302) – seems to retract the 
very thing that legitimates group rights in the first place, namely, that the cultural 
resources that such rights are supposed to protect are not voluntarily acquired and 
redistributed at will by individual members seeking to satisfy their own prefer-
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ences, but are constitutive of identity, having been acquired involuntarily through 
socialization. 
Finally, Habermas’s distinction between legitimate “enabling rights” and il-
legitimate “protective rights” is impossible to maintain in practice. Habermas 
himself observes that “this distinction ceases to be useful when the same col-
lective rights simultaneously serve both functions, as in the Amish case” (BNR: 
299). But the point is not that collective rights sometimes serve both functions. 
The point is that internal dissenters are invariably regarded as external threats 
to group identity. It would therefore appear that what is most problematic is not 
that groups try to preserve themselves by policing their internal identities dem-
ocratically but that they do so in a manner that fails to adequately respect their 
members’ basic right to exit.16
16 The conditions for exercising this right robustly cannot always be met – as can be 
seen in the case of women who live in patriarchal religious communities and Evan-
gelicals who live on tribal reservations. In some cases, exit strategies, even when for-
mally available, may not be optimal for those who might take advantage of them. In 
these cases principles of self-determination and individual freedom may both have to 
be compromised in order to reach an equitable resolution. Indeed, there remains one 
striking case in which the conditions for exit are always problematic: persons who 
want to emigrate from their native community due to cultural persecution depend 
upon the hospitality of others to allow them to immigrate into their community under 
terms that are often uncertain. 
